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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“After decades in the shadows”, Murray Smith and Thomas Wartenberg proclaim, 
“the philosophy of film has arrived, borne on the currents of the wider revival of 
philosophical aesthetics.”1 Of specific interest in this growing discipline is the notion 
of film as philosophy. In a question: “To what extent can film - or individual films - 
act as a vehicle of or forum for philosophy itself?”2 Many have responded that films 
can indeed do philosophy, in some significant sense. 3  Furthermore, it has been 
claimed that this virtue does not belong solely to ‘art’ films, but that popular cinema 
too can do philosophy.4 
A case in point is Spike Jonze’s 1999 film Being John Malkovich, the Oscar-
winning screenplay of which was written by Charlie Kaufman. The outrageous 
premise of this comic fantasy is summarised by the film’s protagonist, Craig 
Schwartz: 
 
There’s a tiny door in my office Maxine. It’s a portal, and it takes you inside John 
Malkovich. You see the world through John Malkovich's eyes. And then, after about 
fifteen minutes, you're spit out into a ditch on the side of the New Jersey Turnpike.  
                                                 
1
  Smith and Wartenberg (2006), p.1. 
2
  Ibid. 
3
  Notably Mulhall (2002). 
4
  Cavell (1979) and (1981). 
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The philosophical issues that this scenario raises are manifold. My primary aim in this 
paper is to follow the film through its exploration of subjectivity, clarifying its 
insights with the aid of current philosophical work on the topic. Hopefully, this will 
enhance our understanding both of subjectivity, and of the philosophical relevance of 
the film. A secondary goal of this enquiry is to employ the film as a case study in film-
as-philosophy, discussing the nature of its philosophical credentials.  
 
II. FILM AS PHILOSOPHY 
Before considering the case of Being John Malkovich, we must see how far we can 
take the idea that film can do philosophy. The literature on this issue displays three 
main dimensions of disagreement, each of which concerns some subordinate question. 
The first such question, captured by Paisley Livingston, asks “who (or what) is to be 
taken as doing the real philosophical work?”5 The second issue concerns what kind of 
contribution film can make to philosophical enquiry. The third asks “why take the 
detour” into film doing philosophy, rather than sticking to philosophical texts, or even 
to other types of art?6 I will distinguish three positions on the question of film-as-
philosophy: the bold view, the sceptical view and the moderate view. Each will offer a 
different set of answers to these subordinate questions. 
The ‘bold view’ is an amalgam of those claims in the literature that are most 
optimistic about the philosophical power of film. This position regards the film itself 
as actively performing philosophical work.7 Stephen Mulhall sees films “as thinking 
seriously and systematically… in just the ways that philosophers do.”8 According to 
Stanley Cavell, Joseph Kupfer and Cynthia Freeland, the contributions that film can 
make to philosophical discourse can be both significant and original.9 Furthermore, a 
bold view would regard these insights as specifically filmic: that is, they could not 
have been provided by a different artistic medium or by a philosophical text.10  
The ‘sceptical view’ combines the more pessimistic claims made about film’s 
philosophical power, opposing the bold view on all three dimensions. Livingston 
                                                 
5
  Livingston (2009), p.3. 
6
  Ibid, p.4 
7
  For an elucidation of this notion see Shaw (2006). 
8
  Mulhall (2002), p.2. 
9
  See Cavell (1979), Kupfer (1999) and Freeland (2000). 
10
  Livingston’s criticism of this position acknowledges that few thinkers explicitly support it, though 
many lean towards it; see Livingston (2006), p.18. 
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argues that “a film does not have any beliefs, so it cannot hold or promote views about 
metaphysical topics.”11 Consequently, we can only describe a film as philosophical if 
it reflects philosophical intentions of the film-makers. He warns that most films are 
not made with such a purpose, and that philosophers must be careful not to project 
their own reflections onto the film-makers. Though some films express philosophical 
intentions, on the sceptical view their contribution to philosophy “can have at most a 
heuristic or pedagogic function.”12 A film never offers “confirmation of any general 
theses (philosophical or other) about the actual world.” 13  Bruce Russell argues 
convincingly that we cannot infer necessities or probabilities from the fictions 
portrayed in film. 14  Film might offer an enjoyable expression of a philosophical 
position, but the real philosophical work must be done elsewhere. 
The ‘modest view’ is my own position, and seeks to navigate a middle course 
between the bold and sceptical positions. We should agree with Livingston that a film 
is only philosophical if it reflects philosophical intentions in the film-maker. 
However, film-makers can intend much more than to illustrate or express a 
philosophical position. Wartenberg argues that “fiction films can function as 
philosophical thought experiments.”15 It is standard for philosophers to invent peculiar 
hypothetical situations in order to reveal certain possibilities, or establish certain 
distinctions. Such thought-experiments offer an interlocutor reason to believe some 
philosophical conclusion. Film can have precisely the same dialectical force. Russell 
recommends caution when drawing inferences from film, but acknowledges that they 
are capable of “offering counterexamples to proposed necessary truths.”16 This allows 
film an active role in philosophical enquiry. 
This film-as-thought-experiment position should not assume that from x’s being 
depicted on film, we can infer the possibility of x, since some films plausibly present 
impossible scenarios. One example of this is the Terminator franchise, which rests on 
a paradoxical time-travel scenario that many metaphysicians would dismiss as 
impossible. This need not deter us. Just as thought-experiments are useful devices that 
occasionally misfire, so too are philosophical films. Exercising caution, we can regard 
the fictional world of a film as helping us come to realise that something is possible, 
                                                 
11
  Livingstone (2009), p.194. 
12
  As described by Wartenberg (2004). 
13
  Livingstone (2009), p.196, emphasis in original. 
14
  Russell (2005), p.390. 
15
  Wartenberg (2004). 
16
  Russell (2005), p.390. 
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rather than itself proving it to be so. By eliciting such philosophical responses, Mary 
Litch argues that “a work of fiction can sometimes function like an argument.”17 
We should reject the bold claim that the insights a film provides could never have 
been provided outside film.18 That said, taking philosophy on a detour through film 
achieves much more than improving its accessibility and vivacity. Film is, in some 
respects, superior to academic texts at presenting thought-experiments. I will 
postpone my justification of this last point until after my exploration of Being John 
Malkovich. Overall, this film will act as an example of film-as-philosophy that 
complements the moderate view. The film may not achieve what the bold position 
would wish, but I hope to show that it exceeds the boundaries proposed by the 
sceptical position. 
  
III.  SUBJECTIVITY 
III.i  The Topic of Enquiry 
What precisely is the philosophical issue that the film is intended to explore? In the 
film, Craig Schwartz summarises the significance of the portal as follows: 
 
It raises all sorts of philosophical type questions, y’know. About the nature of the 
self, about the existence of a soul, y’know. Am I me? Is Malkovich Malkovich? ... Do 
you see what a metaphysical can of worms this portal is? 
 
This indicates that the key philosophical issue in the film is subjectivity, and is a sure 
sign of the philosophical intent of the film-makers. The term ‘subjective’ has a variety 
of applications, but in essence it concerns the property of self-hood, of being an 
individual with their own personal experiences and their own perspective on the 
world.19 Subjectivity is connected intimately to consciousness. Thomas Nagel claims 
that “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is 
like to be that organism–something it is like for the organism.”20 This first-person 
point of view, that science inevitably ignores, is precisely what the film is concerned 
with: the portal seems to reveal what it is like to be John Malkovich.  
 
                                                 
17
  Litch (2002), p.1. 
18
  Livingstone (2006) makes a strong case for this conclusion. 
19
   On the various uses of ‘subjective’ see De Sousa (1999). 
20
  Nagel (1974), p.436, emphasis in original. 
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III.ii  Three Questions 
The film engages with at least three issues of subjectivity:  
1. Aspect. Firstly, it explores what the different aspects of a subject are. Self-hood 
is a complicated thing, so isolating its different elements and the relationships 
between them is a substantial philosophical project. The film employs concrete 
examples to explore the topic, asking ‘What is John Malkovich?’ and ‘What is Craig 
Schwartz?’, dividing those individuals into their constituent elements. 
2. Privacy. Of these different aspects of the subject, which must be exclusively 
owned by that subject, and which of them could conceivably be owned by a different 
subject? Michael Tye clarifies this question by noting that one’s watch, or even one’s 
heart, could end up being owned by someone else, while one’s pains, it seems, could 
not.21 The film explores which aspects of Malkovich could fall under the ownership of 
those who enter the portal, such as Craig. Related to this issue of private ownership is 
the question of private access: our exclusive possession of a kind of self-knowledge. 
This epistemic privacy is at the heart of the problem of other minds.22 It seems that I 
can have direct access only to my own mind, and that the inaccessibility of other 
minds makes it difficult to justify my beliefs about their characteristics, or even their 
existence. Does the portal truly offer direct contact with Malkovich’s mind, or are 
there aspects of Malkovich to which he maintains exclusive access? 
3. Essence. The third question explored by the film concerns essence. Of the 
established aspects of a subject, which are the necessary features of that subject, and 
which merely contingent? As Malkovich begins to lose certain aspects of himself, the 
film explores whether Malkovich himself still remains. Similarly, as characters such 
as Craig begin to acquire aspects of Malkovich, the film asks whether they remain the 
same subject, or become someone else. As Daniel Shaw puts it, “Can these 
individuals accurately be described as having enjoyed being John Malkovich?”23 
Raising these questions is itself a philosophical achievement of the film but, as we 
will see, the film also sheds light on how we should answer those questions. The next 
three sections each focus on one element of the film, showing how it establishes an 
aspect of subjectivity, and how it encourages conclusions about the privacy and 
                                                 
21
  Tye (1995). 
22
  For a review of this issue see Avramides (2001). 
23
  Shaw (2006), p.114. 
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essentiality of that aspect. Each section also considers possible connections between 
the film scenario and real-life cases of non-standard subjectivity. 
 
IV.  SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE AND SEEING THROUGH MALKOVICH’S EYES 
IV.i  The Film Scenario 
After Craig has crawled through the mysterious door in his office, he finds himself 
seeing what Malkovich sees. As Malkovich looks at himself in a mirror, Craig too 
sees Malkovich’s reflection from the same position. This is communicated through 
the camera’s first-person perspective. As Malkovich eats his toast, Craig hears the 
crunching as if it was inside his own head. Later in the film, when Craig’s wife Lotte 
goes through the portal, we learn she experiences the same tactile sensations as 
Malkovich. Overall, the portal seems to offer people precisely the same sensory inputs 
as those enjoyed by Malkovich.  
 
IV.ii  What the Scenario Demonstrates 
1). Aspect. This element of the film identifies the perspectival aspect of subjectivity. 
All of our sensory perceptions are from a specific point of view, normally that of our 
body and its sense organs. The events concern the perspective distinctive to 
Malkovich’s sense-organs. Philosophical work on subjectivity recognises the 
significance of perceptual perspective. For instance, William Lycan places great 
philosophical weight on the fact that “different subjects differ informationally with 
respect to the same external environment.” 24  Thomas Metzinger describes 
‘perspectivalness’ as “a global, structural property of phenomenal space as a whole”, 
noting that “it possesses an immovable center.”25 Frederic Peters, working from the 
position of cognitive science, describes perceptions as having a “self-locational 
reference frame.”26 
2). Privacy. The fact that the portal allows people to take on Malkovich’s 
perceptual perspective indicates that this perspective is not logically private to him. 
There is nothing incoherent about the notion of individuals other than Malkovich 
having the same perceptual inputs as he does, nor to having them at the same time as 
he does. If Malkovich does enjoy an exclusive epistemic access to anything, it clearly 
                                                 
24
  Lycan (1990), p.117. 
25
  Metzinger (2000), p.9. 
26
  Peters (2010), p.13. 
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is not to the data of his senses. 
3). Essence. As Craig loses the perceptual perspective centred on his own body, 
and takes on that of Malkovich, Craig himself persists as a subject. He maintains an 
unbroken stream of memories, keeps the same character traits and so on. In no sense 
does the new perspective make Craig cease to be who he is. The normal perceptual 
perspective that Craig had before entering the portal is thus presented as a merely 
accidental aspect of Craig, and not among his essential properties. As subjects, we are 
thus only contingently connected to the sensory perspective offered by our body, and 
furthermore, only contingently disconnected from the sensory perspectives associated 
with other bodies. 
 
IV.iii  The Scenario’s Relation to Real Cases 
Many philosophers of a scientific bent explore subjectivity by considering cases in 
which standard subjectivity is frustrated. This might be the result of some 
experimental set-up, or of a deficit in an individual.27  This attention to the non-
standard resembles the film-makers’ methodology of engaging with obscure and 
extreme possibilities.  
Many real-life cases show a subject’s perspective diverging from their actual 
bodily location. A mild example of this is Vilayanur Ramachandran’s experiment in 
which participants feel that their nose is located to the side of its real location, 
creating what Rita Carter calls a “Phantom Nose.” 28  Another experiment leads 
participants to feel that their body is located a few feet away from their actual bodily 
location.29 The much-explored phenomenon of the ‘out of body experience’ provides 
more extreme cases of a subject’s perspective diverging from the perspective offered 
by their sense organs.30 Perhaps it is possible to have an out of body experience in 
which the world is experienced from the position of another person. 
The events described in Being John Malkovich offer an extension of these cases. In 
the real-life examples the brain makes some kind of error in processing the 
information offered by our own sense organs. By contrast, the film’s portal offers a 
direct connection to the sensory inputs of a different body. Where Craig’s own body 
goes when he enters the portal is unclear, but he evidently is no longer influenced by 
                                                 
27
  Van Gulick (1995). 
28
  Ramachandran (1998) and Carter (2005). 
29
  Lenggenhager et al. (2007). 
30
  For a review of such cases see Metzinger (2003), pp.488-504. 
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its sensory inputs.31 This points to the possibility of a thorough disconnection of the 
subject from their own body’s sense organs, and from the perceptual perspective that 
those organs offer.  
 
V.  SUBJECTIVE AGENCY AND ACTING THROUGH MALKOVICH’S BODY 
V.i  The Film Scenario 
After several visits through the portal, Craig begins to take control of Malkovich’s 
body. Where before Craig found himself connected to the bodily inputs of 
Malkovich’s senses, now he attaches himself to Malkovich’s bodily outputs, his 
physical behaviour. Interestingly, earlier scenes show Craig controlling the 
movements of his puppets, which act as a kind surrogate body through which he 
expresses himself. Where Craig controls his puppets via movements of his own body, 
here he controls Malkovich’s body directly. Furthermore, where Craig cannot take on 
the perceptual position of his puppets, he controls Malkovich’s body from a first-
person perspective. The most dramatic depiction of Craig’s control is when 
Craig/Malkovich’s lover Maxine says “Do a puppet show for me Craig, honey”, 
leading Craig to put on a show with Malkovich’s body that we have already witnessed 
him perform with his wooden puppets. 
 
V.ii What the Scenario Demonstrates 
1). Aspect. The element of Malkovich that Craig steals is his bodily agency. This is 
the capacity to move your body through your acts of will. Metzinger emphasises that 
this agency is not just a matter of the subject causing an action, but of their being 
aware of themselves as causing the action. We experience our actions “as 
systematically correlated self-generated events.” 32  Many have recognised the 
evolutionary importance of recognising certain physical events as self-caused. 33 
Without agency, the subject is merely a passive perceiver of the world. Like 
Malkovich after Craig’s take-over, a subject without agency cannot actively engage 
with their environment. 
2). Privacy. We are shown that control over your body is an aspect of yourself that 
                                                 
31
  The question of the location of things entering the portal comes to the fore when Craig enters 
Malkovich’s head with a piece of wood but exits without it, leading him to consider where that wood is. 
On Craig’s final visit through the portal he emerges, unnervingly, with the wood in hand. 
32
  Metzinger (2003) p.309 
33
  For instance, Peters (2010). 
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can conceivably be taken over by a different subject. The perspectival aspect of 
subjectivity transpired to be something that Craig and Malkovich could ‘own’ 
simultaneously, but Craig acquires his control to the exclusion of Malkovich. For 
instance, after Craig’s first successful act of control Malkovich shouts “That’s not me. 
I didn't say that.” The film does, however, present more complex cases in which the 
ownership of Malkovich’s actions is unclear. Craig’s wife Lotte, for example, appears 
to influence what Malkovich himself wills. This leads Malkovich to feel, as he puts it, 
“strangely compelled” without Lotte ever taking direct control of his body. 
3). Essence. It is clear that “Craig remains Craig when he enters the portal.”34 
When referred to as Malkovich by a man in a bar, Craig/Malkovich shouts back “I am 
not Malkovich!” Craig’s control of his own body is thus presented as not essential to 
his identity. Similarly, when Malkovich loses his bodily agency, he persists as a 
powerless subject watching Craig take control of his life. This is evident towards the 
end of the film when Malkovich, on briefly regaining control of his body, says “I’m 
free”, indicating that he had persisted as a subject without his bodily agency. 
Shaw adopts an interpretation of the film that initially appears at odds with this 
conclusion. He writes that “the key to being John Malkovich was to be the will behind 
the actions of the Malkovich vessel.” 35  Shaw goes on to relate this idea to 
existentialist notions of identity, focusing on the Nietzschean conception of the self as 
a hierarchy of wills. Shaw is right that the film emphasises the supreme importance of 
control, but his claims about essence are at odds with the film’s depiction of the 
empowered Craig and of the powerless Malkovich. Shaw himself appears to realise 
this, softening his conclusion with the claim that maybe “nobody succeeded in truly 
being John Malkovich”, and that the powerless Malkovich has only “effectively” 
ceased to be.36 As such, we can regard Shaw as agreeing with our interpretation of the 
film’s implications for identity, though we wishes to emphasise that the film presents 
power as the aspect of self that really matters. 
  
V.iii  The Scenario’s Relation to Real Cases 
Studies by many psychologists examine ‘mania’; a phenomenon often associated with 
schizophrenia. Here the subject can experience themselves as controlling events in the 
                                                 
34
  Litch, (2002),  p.82. 
35
  Shaw, (2006), p.115. 
36
  Ibid, p.117. 
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world including the actions of another body, much like Craig does. There are also 
many studies of the alarming phenomenon of “anarchic hand.”37 Here a subject feels 
that the movements of a limb are not their own, which would seem to match 
Malkovich’s experience as Craig takes control. However, both of these real cases 
involve false representations. Mania is clearly a delusion and Metzinger suggests that 
the movements of an anarchic hand are caused by the subject, but that an awareness 
of their intentions is unavailable to them.38 By contrast, Craig and Malkovich have 
veridical experiences of their agency and lack of agency respectively.  
Carter examines the phenomenon of dream-paralysis in which individuals wake up 
from a dream but are unable to move. This is due to a chemical “motor blockade” that 
the brain deploys when we dream, but that sometimes fails to recede.39 This real loss 
of bodily agency is akin to Malkovich’s situation, but there seem to be no genuine 
cases of taking control of another person’s body. As such, the film depicts a more 
radical possibility than has been found in actuality. 
 
VI.  THE SUBJECTIVE MIND AND THINKING MALKOVICH’S THOUGHTS 
VI.i  The Film Scenario 
The portal allows Craig to take on Malkovich’s perceptual perspective and, 
eventually, to take control of Malkovich’s body. As has been established, we see that 
Craig endures through this peculiar alteration. For instance, we hear Craig’s “inner 
monologue” as he wills Malkovich’s body to act. Furthermore, the actions he 
performs through Malkovich’s body correspond to desires that we know Craig has.40 
For example, in this new body Craig succeeds in winning the affections of Maxine, 
and fulfils his dream of becoming a famous puppeteer. Even Craig’s turn of phrase is 
reflected in Malkovich’s speech.  
 
VI.ii  What it Demonstrates 
1). Aspect. This element of the film helps us to identify Craig as a thinker. In total 
isolation from his own body, we see Craig continue an unbroken stream of thought. It 
is within these thoughts that his psychological dispositions are manifest; his desires, 
his beliefs and his memories. This itself is clearly a complex aspect of the subject 
                                                 
37
  Blakemore et al. (2002). 
38
  Metzinger (2003). 
39
  Carter (2005). 
40
  Litch (2002) points this out. 
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which could doubtless be analysed in to yet more parts.  
The film also explores the relationship between thinking, agency and perspective. 
The perceptual perspective provided by our body’s sense organs determine what we 
perceive, but it is in thought that we reflect upon this input. Similarly, our agency over 
a body determines what we move, but it is in thought that we choose which actions to 
perform. This complements a distinction between the mind and the body to which it is 
contingently connected, and through which it perceives and interacts with the world.  
2). Privacy. Malkovich never loses ownership of his own thoughts and Craig never 
acquires the thoughts of Malkovich. Inside Malkovich’s head are two distinct streams 
of thought belonging to Malkovich and Craig respectively. This encourages the 
conclusion that, unlike one’s watch, one’s thoughts can never be owned by anyone but 
you. The film also sheds light on the epistemic aspect of privacy. It seems that only 
Malkovich has direct access to what he is thinking. The portal never provides this 
special knowledge of Malkovich’s thoughts. Of course, we should remember 
Russell’s observation that “no one can establish that something holds in all possible 
worlds by presenting an example or two from a possible world depicted in film.”41 We 
cannot infer from the film that owning thoughts is necessarily private. We can, though, 
note that this necessity is respected in the film. 
Several events indicate the film-makers’ acknowledgement of this privacy. Lester, 
the eccentric manager of the office that houses the portal, believes erroneously that he 
has a terrible speech impediment. “I've been very lonely in my isolated tower of 
indecipherable speech”, he tells Craig. Perhaps this scene illustrates that the thoughts 
of others are known only indirectly, through the imperfect medium of language, and 
that our awareness of our thoughts is inevitably ‘lonely.’  
3). Essence. Is the thinking part of Malkovich essential to him being the subject 
that he is? It seems the film encourages this conclusion. With all the changes that 
Malkovich and Craig undergo, their respective streams of thought appear to be the 
enduring kernel that defines them. Litch advocates this interpretation of the film.42 If 
Craig no longer had his own thoughts after entering the portal, in what sense would 
Craig be in Malkovich’s head? If Malkovich’s thoughts disappeared when Craig took 
over his body, wouldn’t Malkovich then cease to exist? In Cartesian parlance, one 
might say that we are essentially thinking things, and so without our thinking there 
                                                 
41
  Russell (2005), p.390. 
42
  Litch (2002). 
 TOM MCCLELLAND, 
21 
 
would be no ‘thing’ left of us. 
If having Malkovich’s thoughts is an essential part of being the subject John 
Malkovich then, despite the film’s title, nobody ever truly becomes John Malkovich. 
An interview with Kaufman, the film’s writer, indicates that this was his philosophical 
intention. He says “you are inside someone else’s skin, but Craig doesn't have the 
experience of being Malkovich, he has the experience of using Malkovich.”43 The fact 
that the portal only connects you to Malkovich’s body, rather than his mind, is 
reflected in the characters’ motivations for entering the portal. Craig wants to become 
attractive to Maxine, Lotte wants to become a man, an overweight character wants to 
become thin and Lester and his friends want to become young. The mind of 
Malkovich is irrelevant to these objectives. They want only to take on the body to 
which Malkovich’s mind is contingently connected. 
 
VI.iii  The Scenario’s Relation to Real Cases 
Since our conclusion here is that having other people’s thoughts is impossible, it is not 
surprising that there are no real-life cases that would indicate such an occurrence. 
However, it is worth noting that some propose actual cases of two distinct thinking 
subjects in one head. This position is motivated by genuine medical cases, though the 
interpretation of those cases is quite unconvincing. 44 There is no reason to believe 
that the logical possibility presented in the film is ever actual. 
 
VII.  WHAT THE FILM ACHIEVES 
The film successfully executes the apparent philosophical ambitions of its makers 
and, consequently, should be regarded as a genuine piece of philosophy. This thought-
experiment-on-celluloid encourages a series of conclusions concerning the nature of 
subjectivity.45 Its value does not appear to be essentially filmic; a graphic novel of 
Being John Malkovich could perhaps have boasted the same philosophical merit. That 
said, I would argue that the film offers something an academic article on subjectivity 
could not. 
Firstly, in comparison to a philosopher’s thought-experiment, film offers 
                                                 
43
  Quoted by Shaw (2006) p.115 
44
  For a sceptical commentary on such claims see Lockwood (1989) 
45
  It should be acknowldged that the film also explores the role of one’s name in their identity as 
discussed by Turner (2002) and Litch (2002). 
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“particularly acute, detailed, and concrete illustrations.”46 This richness of content 
gives film a superior dialectical force. In the first section, I noted the fallibility of 
thought-experiments. One of the established standard errors one can make with this 
method is known as “defeater neglect.”47  This is when we believe that p is possible 
because we are unaware of some q such that q entails p’s impossibility. An analogue 
of this error is plausibly exemplified in the Terminator case: the cursory depiction of 
the time-travel scenarios means the film ‘neglects’ the paradoxical elements that entail 
the impossibility of the events it depicts. With this in mind, we can propose that the 
more detailed a thought-experiment is, the lower the chances are of defeater neglect. 
Being John Malkovich offers a scenario that is far more detailed and multi-faceted 
than any academic thought-experiment, so perhaps we are more justified in inferring 
these conclusions about subjectivity from the film than we would be from a 
philosophical text.48 
Secondly, though the film does not lead us to any new conclusions about 
subjectivity, a case could be made for the film improving our understanding of those 
conclusions. Believing some proposition does not guarantee the full incorporation of 
that proposition into our minds, especially with the highly abstract propositions of 
philosophy. When watching the film, we engage with this thought-experiment almost 
as if it was real. This plausibly helps us to integrate the possibilities depicted with our 
wider beliefs and intuitions, improving our “imaginative mobility.”49 The way we 
experience film helps us to appreciate these possibilities from the ‘centered’ 
perspective of a character, due to the complex “structures of sympathy” involved in 
our engagement.50 Furthermore, “Our propensity to respond emotionally to fictional 
characters is a key aspect of our experience and enjoyment of narrative films.”51 As 
such, where an academic text might establish some element of the self, the film can be 
more “emotionally engaging”, 52  revealing how we feel about that element. 
Malkovich’s loss of agency, for instance, is far more disconcerting than people 
accessing his perceptual perspective. This elicited emotional response allows us to 
                                                 
46
  Freeland and Wartenberg (1995). 
47
  See Stoljar (2006) p.77. 
48
  Wartenberg (2007) suggests that The Matrix improves upon Descartes’ evil demon thought-
experiment, but only insofar as it modernises it. This is not a significantly philosophical advantage. 
49
  Smith (1995) p.235. 
50
  Smith (1995) and (1999). 
51
  Smith (1995), p.1. 
52
  Livingstone (2006), p.11. 
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understand subjectivity on a more personal level.  
Overall, Being John Malkovich falls short of the bold view’s over-ambitious dream 
of a film itself actively providing original and essentially filmic contributions to 
philosophy. It does, however, surpass the limitations proposed by the sceptical view, 
boasting achievements in line with the moderate view of film-as-philosophy I 
advocate. Does the film present us with the comprehensive truths of self-hood? 
Perhaps not. But as Charlie Sheen says to Malkovich in the film, “truth is for suckers 
Johnny boy.”53 
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53
  It is no coincidence that Kaufman’s other screenplays are also notably philosophical. Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind explores the ethics of memory erasure (see Grau 2006), Adaptation 
examines the nature of authorship, Synechdoche, New York considers our relationship to art and all of 
these films have a great deal to say about the self. This is evidence of Kaufman’s philosophical intent 
in this film. 
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